

① [] us of in camera understood to mean by parties

[] told Ryan that we could make
this available in an in camera proceeding

Your concern is more with implying the material
may be handed over to S.

Protective Order

spell out terms of a suitable protective order

②

Such an ~~order~~ ^{order} would permit the defendant and his
counsel to have access to those documents under certain
conditions, ^{but} would not permit them to remove the documents or notes
to their files, and would prohibit any unauthorized ^{derivative testimony}
disclosure of classified information.

At no point will Fogel and his lawyer
get uncontrolled use of those documents.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: []

OGC

SUBJECT: Name Table Request ~~off~~ from Office of Special Investigations, DOJ

On 21 January 1980 ^{being represented by} the undersigned met with

Representatives of the Office of Special Investigations, DOJ

~~and~~ a proposed name table request ~~was~~ ~~discussed~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~meeting~~ ~~on~~ ~~21~~ ~~January~~ ~~1980~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~DOJ~~

from OSI. ~~Representatives~~ ~~present~~ at this meeting were

Walter J. Locken, Director OSI;

Ryan and Arthur

Sini, Deputy Directors, OSI; [] and

[], DOJ/CI; []

and []

undesignated. From a discussion ~~which~~ ~~was~~ concerning the limitations

Sinai, Lockhart, Ryan

- DOD will do complete trace request
- Get 2 350,000 other army trace requests
- Looking for Army G-2 releases
- CIA has permission from DOD to release ~~some~~ some CIA documents to third parties.
- Limit search to OS & DO files

DOD has not prioritized requests but will
list names of interest

CIA will not contact S. as tip off CIA.

CIA will not permit any leading question that will tip off S.

- Instead of direct statements offer a most count

We will ask our staffers if they know

- Responses to interrogatory

Thurman

Put CIA properly advised in letter

Sinai

Distinguish

1. No Release
 2. No Ops. Interest
 3. Personal letter NOT germane to OSI interests
-
-

Documents 142

- wrap up with

Doc. 3

- arranged the polygraph w/ the source told by [] that it was a requirement for CIA Govt employees
- Poly took place in [] (Morton County)
- national activities in 2nd country

ident - positively

Doc. identifies CIA polygraph station

- not would reveal that this guy, response to one overseas location would not overseas to

conduct polygraph
- does identify location of regional polygraph branch
CIBER w/ poly branch as one of regional poly operations

Document

document in whole compromises names of Unit with station
May not Mark's role to internal information
concerning British House.

Doc 4.

Counterintelligence measures

Secretarial names of informants as

relevant could

- identifies cover identities & names

identifies uses names on contemporary

operational targeting CIA had.

- Doc. reveals that from CIA, not any was info/100

Doc 5.

Biography by Goodson.

- History of S's life times w/ CIA.

- Involved w/ own efforts to train S. for possible

not work

- problem not so much w/ document, but w/ circumstances

1. Army cover unit (not personally involved)

2. Person

3. Field operations

- hundreds of thousands, unwilling, who were forced to be "human" going over the

- REVELATION WOULD REVEAL COVER UNIT, HOW DEACTIVATED,
HIT NEVER BLOW,
LFC # of persons who had exposure to TOLD UNIT

Disc 6

IDENTIFIES THIS NAME OF ONLY OPERATOR?
- IS THIS GUY IN ALIAS?

CONTAINS INFO

ON OPS, STATIONS, INDIVIDUALS (PERSONAL)

METHODS OF OPERATION & TARGETS.

CONTAINS DIRECT PHOTOS FROM DISC 4

BE

REFORMER'S DOCUMENT 142

ALLAN A. RYAN, JR.
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
~~THE~~ DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1375 K ST, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

DEAR MR. RYAN:

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST OF 1 APRIL 1980, I HAVE
ASKED THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS, CIA, TO CONDUCT A SEARCH OF
ITS FILES FOR ANY RECORD OF EMPLOYMENT